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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., and FIRST SECURITY 
FINANCIAL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BANBERRY CROSSING, a Utah 
partnership, et al., 
Defendants/Appellants, 
EUGENE L. KIMBALL, et al., 
Defendant/Respondent, 
vs. 
KEITH GARNER and SNOW, 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, a 
partnership, et al., 
Cross-Claim 
Defendants/Respondents. 
RESPONDENT SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 
AND MARTINEAUfS MEMORANDUM 
Case No. 20266 
Pursuant to the directions of the Court made at oral 
argument, respondent Snow, Christensen & Martineau (SCM) submits 
herewith the following memorandum as to the evidence establishing 
the date of appellants1 default on the trust deed note and trust 
deed. 
The trust deed note, Exhibit 8, a copy of which is 
attached to appellants1 memorandum, provides for payment by 
Banberry to respondent Kimball of the sum of $2,150,000 to be 
paid in annual installments, and with interest to be paid 
quarterly commencing January 5, 1981. There was attached to the 
note a Schedule B providing for release of one condominium pad 
for each $8,100 paid to principal, and for the release of one 
single family lot for each $25,200 paid to principal. Paragraph 
C of Schedule B provided that it was the responsibility of the 
trustor to select the parcels to be released and so inform the 
beneficiary. 
The trust deed given to secure payment of the trust deed 
note provided in Paragraph 14, "Upon default by trustor in the 
payment of any indebtedness secured hereby or in the performance 
of any agreement hereunder, all sums secured hereby shall 
immediately become due and payable at the option of beneficiary. 
In the event of such default, beneficiary may execute or cause 
trustee to execute a written notice of default and of election to 
cause said property to be sold. . . . " 
The evidence is undisputed, and it is admitted in 
appellants1 memorandum, that the interest payment due on the note 
on October 5, 1982 was not paid, and that neither the interest 
payment nor principal payment due on January 5, 1983 were paid 
(appellants' memorandum, page 2; Kimball testimony, Tr. Vol. I, 
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pages 160, 162, 163; Harmon testimony, Tr. Vol. Ill, pages 55-56; 
and Evans testimony, Tr. Vol. IV, page 45.) In fact, when Harmon 
met with Kimball in the fall of 1982, Harmon told Kimball that 
"the corporation had no assets and millions of dollars of 
liabilities" (Tr. Vol. Ill, page 56) . Harmon showed Kimball a 
Price-Waterhouse report (presumably Exhibit 29) which showed 
"just how bad the situation was" (Tr. Vol. Ill, page 56). Evans 
testified that in mid-1982 Banberry became and remained 
"hopelessly insolvent" (Tr. Vol. IV, page 83). In the fall of 
1982, Harmon was attempting to persuade Kimball either to release 
all of the property to Banberry or to take over the property 
subject to the First Security mortgage. No claim was asserted at 
that time, that is either in October, 1982 or January, 1983, that 
Banberry had offsets against Kimball that exceeded the amounts of 
interest and principal then due, and thereby excused payment. 
During Evans' testimony there was received in evidence 
Exhibit 30, a certified audit report on the Banberry entities 
prepared by Price-Waterhouse, an independent accounting firm. 
That exhibit specifically showed that on January 31, 1983 
Banberry was in default on the trust deed note. Note 10, page 13 
of the exhibit stated, "The company is currently in default on 
principal and interest payments due on the trust deed payable of 
$1,525,000. Under conditions of default, the total loan balance 
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is due and payable. . . ." That exhibit shows no credits or 
offsets in favor of Banberry whatsoever. 
Appellants made two feeble efforts to excuse their 
admitted failure to make the interest and principal payments due 
in October 1982 and January 1983. First, they offered into 
evidence Exhibit 28, a self-serving document prepared by the 
witness Evans on the night before his testimony was presented, in 
an effort to show that Banberry had offsets against Kimball in 
excess of the amount of the interest and principal payments then 
due. In a lengthy cross-examination of Evans extending over 100 
pages of transcript, counsel for respondents were able to 
demonstrate that most of the claimed items making up the offset 
were either lacking in competent evidentiary support, or as a 
matter of law were not valid offsets (Tr. Vol. IV, pages 66-175). 
Eliminating all of these non-meritorious items reduces the amount 
of the claimed offset to a figure less than the unpaid interest 
and principal payments required by the note. 
Second, a final effort to salvage their untenable 
position, appellants argue that the beneficiary Kimball did not 
release to them condominium pads and independent building lots in 
accordance with the trust deed note. Banberry ignores the 
provision of the note requiring it to designate the pads and lots 
to be released. The evidence shows without dispute that 
appellants never requested the release of any of the property by 
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condominium pad numbers or by building lot numbers. All requests 
for the release of property were in terms of metes and bounds, 
and Kimball, in each instance, executed reconveyances to the land 
requested to be released. There is no evidence whatsoever that 
Kimball ever refused to release any lands which appellants 
requested to be released, until after they breached their 
contract. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence shows without dispute that there was a 
failure on the part of Banberry to pay the interest payment due 
on October 5, 1982 and the principal and interest payments due 
January 5, 1983. Under the terms of the trust deed the entire 
balance then became due. Appellants have offered no competent 
evidence that their failure to make the payments provided was 
excused either by reason of offset, or by reason of failure of 
Kimball to release lands as provided by the terms of the trust 
deed note. 
Respectfully submitted this '< day of January, 1988. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Ray R. Christensen 
Attorneys for Respondent Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Respondent's Memorandum was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following this // day of January, 1988: 
Edward M. Garrett 
Michael A. Katz 
Garrett & Sturdy 
311 South State, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Malcolm A. Misuraca 
Misuraca, Beyers & Costin 
900 College Avenue 
P. 0. Box 870 
Santa Rosa, California 95402 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P. 0. Box 45,000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Attorneys for Respondents Kimball and Garner 
/> tk J ~y* 
-6-
Edward M. Garrett, #1163 
-MlCliSW A. Katz, #3817 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
ATTORNEYS FOR D e f e n d a n t s B a n b e r r y C r o s s i n g , 
IUITEAWOSECONDSOUTH B a n b e r r y Development C o r p o r a t i o n , 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841H S c a n d i a I n v e s t m e n t Company, H i l l c r e s t 
801-532 2707 I n v e s t m e n t Company, S idney M. Horman 
and C h a r l e s H. Horman 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., and FIRST SECURITY 
FINANCIAL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BANBERRY CROSSING, a Utah 
partnership; BANBERRY 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; SCANDIA 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
general partnership; 
HILLCREST INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a general partnership; SIDNEY 
M. HORMAN; CHARLES H. HORMAN; 
EUGENE L. KIMBALL; et al., 
Defendants/Appellants, 
vs . 
KEITH GARNER and SNOW, 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, 
a partnership, et al., 
Crossclaim Defendants/ 
Respondents. 
HLED 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Case No. 20266 
During oral argument on this appeal, the Court noted 
that there were other parties to the action and obviously 
other issues and questioned whether a certificate had been 
obtained from the lower Court in conjunction with this 
appeal. Counsel was directed to explain the absence of the 
certificate and brief the jurisdictional issue. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The main action was commenced by First Security Bank 
and First Security Financial to foreclose two trust deeds on 
unimproved acreage in Park City. A series of crossclaims 
and counterclaims were filed by the several parties. In 
June, 1984 Banberry Development and Banberry Crossing joined 
Snow, Christensen and Martineau as third party Defendants 
and asserted a claim of breach of fiduciary duty and 
slander of title arising from their employment by Kimball 
and Garner. Kimball and Garner were joined in that matter 
on the theory of respondent superior. 
The claim stated issues entirely separate and distinct 
from other matters in the case although they are 
tangentially involved because the Kimball Note and Trust 
Deed raises issues in the main case. However, the decision 
on matters here involved have no effect on the other issues 
in the case which were tried separately. The Court could 
have proceeded to trial with all parties and issues, but on 
motion of Snow, Christensen and Martineau to dismiss, 
elected to bifurcate the case against them and proceed to 
-?-
trial on these issues before hearing the main action. 
(Minute Entry, R.1039) 
Trial resulted in a directed verdict in favor of Snow, 
Christensen and Martineau. The Court in its written 
judgment states (the claims against Snow, Christensen and 
Martineau) "having been bifurcated for trial'1, then 
proceeded to enter a judgment which is in all respects 
final. (Copy attached). 
Notice of Appeal from the "Judgment11 was filed within 
one month from the Entry of Judgment. (Copy attached). 
Subsequent to the first trial on these issues against 
these parties the main action was tried and all issues in 
the case against all parties was fully and finally 
determined. A separate appeal by some parties on some 
issues is now pending before the Supreme Court. 
A search of the record shows that the lower Court did 
not enter a certificate separate from the judgment directing 
the entry of "final judgment" and stating that "there is no 
just reason for delay" of the appeal. See Pate v. Marathon 
Steel Co., 692 P.2d 765 (Utah 1984). That case was decided 
November 9, 1984 shortly after the Notice of Appeal in this 
case was filed. Before Marathon the procedures necessary to 
hand up a case to the Supreme Court under Rule 54(b) were 
not altogether clear. (Note the trial courts confusion in 
that case: "If the Order is in fact a Final Order, the 
Supreme Court can rule on it.") 
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The road to the Supreme Court in multi-party, multi-
issue cases is not without peril. The confusion between 
Rule 21, 54(b) and 72(a) is readily apparent. 
By way of illustration, Rule 72(a) provides that an 
appeal may be taken from all final orders and judgments but 
a party may file a notice of intent to appeal if the order 
and judgment involves less than all issues or parties. If 
the lower Court entered a final judgment with an appropriate 
Certificate must a party take the Appeal at that point or 
may it be delayed until the end of the litigation by filing 
a Notice of Intent to Appeal? Is a Notice of Appeal filed 
at the conclusion of the litigation too late? 
Assume further that the Court directs the entry of a 
judgment, certifies no reason to delay the appeal and the 
party takes no action until the entire litigation is ended 
and then files a Notice of Appeal within 30 days. Is the 
right of appeal lost because the notice was not filed within 
30 days of the earlier judgment and certificate? 
Suppose the lower Court bifurcates a multi-party, 
multi-issue case under Rule 21 and tries the first part of 
the case separately and enters a judgment without a 
certificate. Does the time for appeal begin from the entry 
of that judgment or may it await the conclusion of the 
entire case? 
The Rules of appellate procedure were not effective 
until January 1, 1985. 
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Rule 54(b) says nothing about an appeal. The term "no 
just reason for delay" has been interpreted in Marathon (and 
Federal cases) to mean no reason to delay the appeal, but it 
could be just as easily construed to mean no reason to delay 
the entry of judgment for purposes of post judgment 
proceedings. Appeal could still be determined to be timely 
if filed within 30 days after the entire litigation was 
concluded. 
Having said all of that we turn to three points which 
will answer the jurisdictional questions posed by the Court. 
POINT I 
RULE 54(b) DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS CASE 
In a footnote the Court stated in Pate v. Marathon 
Supra that "because few Utah cases deal with Rule 54(b), and 
none explain its underlying rationale, we freely look to 
authorities under the Federal Rule". 
Utah Federal Court Judge Christensen, sitting with the 
Second Circuit in the case of Spencer, White & Prentiss, 
Incorporated of Connecticut vs. Pfizer, Incorporated, 498 
Federal 2d 358, opined: 
We have looked into this tangle of Rules 21, 
42(b), 54(b) and 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. and Rule 5(a) 
...only so far as it seems necessary to ascer-
tain our lack of appellate jurisdiction -- an 
obstacle which may prove of little surprise to 
anyone reading this synthesis of the record 
except possibly the parties, but yet confirmed 
only after unraveling some interesting twists in 
the exercise of our jurisdiction to determine 
that we have no jurisdiction. 
-5-
The Court goes on to point out that the Lower Court 
entered an Order of Severance and promptly granted Summary 
Judgment directing entry of the same under Rule 54(b). 
Ruling that the Court did not have jurisdiction because of 
the Lower Court errors, including improper severance, it 
nonetheless held in reaching that result: 
We begin our consideration of jurisdiction with 
recognition that a claim or counterclaim 
properly severed from another by virtue of Rule 
21 "may be...proceeded with separately"; that 
justification for severance is not confined to 
misjoinder of parties; that the fact that a 
counterclaim is a compulsory one does not per se 
preclude its severance under the current rule; 
that appeal from a judgment on a validly severed 
"single claim may be timely taken as of right 
notwithstanding the pendency of the remaining 
claims or counterclaims, and that other possible 
basis for appellate Jurisdiction would have to 
be sought only if the severance constituted an 
excess or abuse of discretion on the part of a 
district court. (Emphasis supplied). 
We find additional clarification on the matter of 
severance in United States v. O'Neil, 709 Federal 2d 361 
(1983). The Court stated: 
Having decided that the district court by each 
of its April 3 judgments in the original four 
OfNeil cases intended and purported thereby to 
sever the government's suit from the appellees' 
counterclaims, we must now determine the effect 
of such a severance. Severance under Rule 21 
creates two separate actions or suits where 
previously there was but one. Where a single 
claim is severed out of a suit, it proceeds as a 
discrete, independent action, and a court may 
render a final, appealable judgment in either 
one of the resulting two actions notwithstanding 
the continued existence of unresolved claims in 
the other. The presence of unresolved claims in 
the other action does not of itself implicate 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b), because that Rule applies 
only where the unresolved claims are in the same 
- f i -
action or suit. We applied this principle in 
Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 193-94 
(5th Cir. 1980), as did the Seventh Circuit in 
Hebel v. Ebersole, 543 F.2d at 16-17. And the 
Second Circuit recognized its general validity 
in Spencer, White, 498 F.2d at 361. This result 
gives recognition to the difference between 
ordering separate trials under Rule 42(b), which 
does not result in discrete, independent suits, 
and severance under Rule 21, which does. 
See also Lusk v. Penzoil United, Inc., 56 FRD 645 (N.D. 
Miss., 1972). 
The action against Snow, Christensen and Martineau was 
severed from the main action by the Court, at their request. 
In a Utah case decided before the adoption of the 
Rules of Procedure, the Court stated: 
We do not pretend to lay down a completely 
comprehensive definition or test of what 
constitutes such a severable interest in a suit 
as to make such judgment of dismissal final as 
to the Plaintiff and such Defendant, for 
purposes of appeal. But it seems that in order 
to be severable, and therefore appealable, any 
determination of the issues so settled by the 
judgment and dismissal must not affect the 
determination of the remaining issues whether 
such judgment on appeal is reversed or affirmed, 
nor may the determination of the issues 
remaining affect the final determination of the 
issues between Plaintiff and the dismissed 
Defendant. Attorney General of Utah vs. 
Pomeroy, et al., 73 P2.d at 1294 (1937). 
The above Rule precisely fits the facts in this 
case. 
POINT II 
IF THIS CASE IS DETERMINED TO BE A 54(b) CASE THE 
TERMINATION OF THE LITIGATION VALIDATES THIS APPEAL 
After this case was severed and tried all of the 
remaining issues in the case were finally determined and 
-7-
appropriate ^udgmenr:? ert.ered, TK-TP Qr^ ^-^aio now 
Research poinr reveals turner'us Federal cases 
holding th.ic e^T ^ ;~ & HOL: ' ~r v-.-— ;- f-' ; -. •-
r .q-.. is-c . ic.::;i .. i.on und, . :io..e::ne:.-,-. ss : w 
entire litigation i s concluded before the Court hears the 
In Li c case c: Anderson vs. Allstate Insurance Company, 
630 rsrier^' :V r*~ -~- f^r -*• stated '-*--" >• - ^  •-: 
AlilAiisi, i;u:- -> a matter oi :J_I-. lnpression i:i 
t: is circuit, two other circuits have held that 
orders adjudicating only some of the :laims may 
be treated <-..• final orders if the remaining 
claims have ^:bsequently been finalised. Jetco 
Electronic Indus. . Inc., v. Gardiner. 4" 3 F. Za 
1228, 1231 (5th Cir. 1973); Frankfort Oil Co. v. 
Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 438 (10th Cir.) , cert. 
denied, 364 U.S. 920, 81 S.Ct, 283, 5 L.Ed". 2d 
259 [I960), In Jetco, the di stri ct court 
dismissed the action as to one of three 
defendants, and several months later entered an 
-ed judgment as to the other defendants. 
.^-^ r.cuzh neither was written as a final order, 
and nhe appellant had failed to obtain a Rule 
54(b) certificate, the cc ur t found thati 
These two orders considered together, 
terminated this litigation just as 
'
 irrectively as would have been the case had 
district judre ^one through the motions 
or enterine single order formally 
''iris th«r substance of the earlier two 
. . **< -. ^:ndful of the Supreme Court fs 
command v . " practical, not technical, 
'^sider- at ions -.re to govern the 
"ication of p: ciples of finality, 
Die v. Unite- cates Steel Corp., 379 
L.L. H T ; 8T~STcrE. "3UF; 13 L.Ed. 2d 199 
(196<0: Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan • 
Corp,, "-^TTTrTTTT 69 S.Ct., 1221, 93 , ... 
T. .td. I"'* (1949), ^ decline appellee's 
T,,ration to exalt iorm over substance by 
--hissing this appeal. 
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Jetco Electronics Indus. , Inc_. v. Gardiner, 
supra, 473 F. ?c\ T~ r* Ve find this analysis 
persu^-1"'7-
Later Gill is vs. U.S. Dept. of H & H Services, 
2d 565 ?fir* Cir ! 0 ^ V fu" rourc ruled: 
Every ._:: occasion tc accress 
this question r: •' *:--V t:tat an interlocutory 
appeal lacking t - requisite rule 54(b) 
certification invokes appellate jurisdiction 
where judgment becomes final prior to . 
• disposition of the appeal. See Pireno v. New 
York Chiropractic Ass'n, 650 F.2d 387, W^W 
n". 4 ("2d Cir. 1981) , aff'd sub nom. Union^Labor 
Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.ST IlT, lOT 
S\Ct. 300^, 73 L.Ed.'"2d 647 ""(1982), P:,:herscnv. ' 
•' Jones, 551 F.2d 918, 922-23 (3 c~" C i FTT77777 
I'ilden Financial Corp. v. Palo Tire Service, 
Inc., 596 F.2d 604, 606-07 ^JJ^Ci^TTTTT; Cape • 
May Greene Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179, 187^83" 
("3d Cir. 1983) ; Jetco Electronic Industries v. 
Gardiner, 473 F.2d 1228, 1231 (5th Cli-.1G73); 
Tower y. Moss, 625 F.2d 11 61. V-1-&5 (5th 
Cir. 1980) ; Alcorn Countv v, '•_ . S. Interstate 
Supplies, l55TT~731 ~FJ^T1MT~TTF5^ (5th 
Cir, 1984) ; Ander s on v. A11 state Insurance C o M 
630 F.2d 67T9 FE1 (9th Cir: 1980) j Bak¥r~v. .' 
Limber, 6 4 7 F . 2 d 9 ] 2 , 916 (9 th C ir: 1981) ; 
Martin v.. Campbell, 692 F.2d 3 12 (11th Cir. 
vrm—"" — " 
Sandidge v. Salen Offshore Drilling r. , „ ",r# 
2 f!985^, the Cc--^ stated: 
•
;r eliminari r:> „ - or; our own 
:-v:ion whether v*^  have appellate jurisdiction. 
On May 21, Salen Protexa filed it:-- notice of 
appeal from the April 23 judgment -- a judgment 
that only disposed of Sandidge7s claim against 
Salen Protexa. Although Sandidge had previously 
settled his claim with Salen Offshore, that 
claim was not dismissed from the -?ase until June 
4, after Salen Protexa file- . tr notice of 
apj ' Hence, regardless cf the district 
) 6 nomenclature, the April -J judgment did 
not - , nstitute a final judgment at the time it 
i /as -mered since Sandidge Ts calim against Salen 
Ofi._-.i~re was then still pending. See Fed. R. Civ. 
P54-* Moreover, Salen Protexa did not: obtain 
a ." • z • Ttifi^ate th;- - v- V d h.'ve 
permitted it r,' rake an appeal from the April 23 
judgment:. Nevertheless, we ha \:- consistently 
held that there is an exception to the require-
emnts o r Rule 54;'b; that allows the; separate 
appeal of a r.onfinal judgment where a subsequent 
judgment of the district court effective!v 
terminated the litigation. 
STATUS UF CASE 1/ 
DO^S NOT HAVF " 
TREME COURT 
"SDTCTTn:i 
I f 
d i e t i n r 
tr^is Ccwci d - t u r b i n e s t_ha: 1 c.- V ^-~: 
^ - r. t • rn? , ^,,
 v 0 
- s t-
r t • e distric:: 
... *; u: , e *. •_ * ^ *. ^  
regard wculd necessarii." h.r'e to b-, 
judgment her? appealed ir **~ "* ~ ~1_ " 
mean tha; . . . ,^t vet f. .. .. 
t i o n fror lo^er cour "- - • 
t ' - : ^' i: 
Wv.. ula be ^c^ic- ir -^-n* L. 'he termination 
the litis--'":."* ~wc Federal Courts have provided solutions 
t~at is o* >rreriTarv 
i i i 
-:. a--. -ir-~ int notices appear irom an inter-
j-ocucory order and subsequently obtains a 
certificate pursuant \ .• Fed.P..Civ .P. 5^'b) for 
appeal of the prior order, must a new notice of 
appeal be filed after entry of the Rule 54 «'b) 
order? Our answer: new norj...^ is not pre-
requisite to our jurisdiction . . - T'ne district 
court did on June 6 make the proper Rule 54 (b) 
certificate by an crder that granted no relief 
except to certify the finality of the June f3, 
1984 order from which the attempted appeal 
originally was taken. Metallurgical Industries, 
filed the certificate and movec 
reinstate the appeal. Appellees now oppose the 
exercise of our jurisdiction on the ground that 
th< f first tn 
d i s t ri c t c our t, t ha t n o no t ice of app e a1 has 
been given to comply with Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1), 
and that no appeal has therefore been taken. If 
that were the result here, it would be a real 
victory of form over substance. The parties and 
judges alike knew that the appeal would proceed 
upon entry of the district courtTs 54(b) 
certificate. 1 1 = .tallurgical Industries, Inc. v. 
Fourtek, Inc. 7 / r¥7lT~lTTTTWW, 
Because the prerequisites for a Rule 54(b) 
certification have not been met, the Tribe's 
appeal from the trial judgeVs decision in Count 
•I is dismissed with leave to seek another appeal 
should proper certification subsequently be 
granted by the Claims Court. If the requisite 
certification Is obtained, the parties may, of 
course, proceed upon the same briefs, record, 
and arguments presented in this dismissed 
..toeal, and these may be supplemented if 
necessary by papers describing any further 
proceedings in the Claims Court. Aleut Tribe v. 
U.S. . 702~F.2c l ' ^ (19H3> 
See Nelson v. c coker, -: .• r , Iv.„ J*-- (TTtarO and Pule 4''~N 
of m e Rules of Appelate Procedure concerning the filing of 
p rema ti n: e n :) 11 • : e s • : • f a p p e a 3 • 
The trial of the action against Sncv, ^hrtstensen and 
Karrineau vas ^f fertile*! v e-----i>-o^  from the main case under 
-^  _ - irarter of right and was 
timely taken. 
"' " • • ;r t disagrees with the abc~ -
o^rvhe^ting authority t. <=. At -ea , t -
trough lacking a 4 fl'' b ^  certificate is 'al-d-ted r^ re-t- T '•: 
the fact tl i at: pri or 
entire litigation had been terminated :r en- i .rvt-r fa •_:-*" 
the. -1 . - • - . . . .ive t^
 L - , 
the lower Court: making the judgment final £_ 
can rr?~ r : 
. ^ -.c-w wii.v_ r* tJ
 K c: <JL JU. 
GARRETT AND STUPDY 
<r~ 
N 
nuwai n*r^ 
CE?.TiFi-j;-r:-. ov : ^ ^ L : : : G 
c:^/ c< tna: r:i 1 ;-i £*' ', 
ci..^ i j : : t 0 ^. -r- p •>. 0 r j 
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IN 
SLMi 1 x. x C\J U u T i , 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF ux^ i:., 
N.A., and FIRST SECURITY 
FINANCIAL, 
Plaintiffs, 
:, BERRY CROSSING, , lah 
partnership, ef T , 
Defendants, 
KEITH E. ^ ARNER 
C r o s s - C l a i m 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
JTAK 
«L 
FILED 
( j ( I I I ' H I i l 
Clfrt (ii Mummi uounig 
bteutv am* 
JUDGMENT 
o i . v l l N o . 7VV7 
The c r o s s - C a x u u c r o s s - c l a i m a n t s Banber ry C r o s s i n g 
and Banber ry Development; C o r p o r a t i o n a g a i n s f cross -defe~ . m 
- - * j bituroaLed 
tux „A. Ld: , -.a...ti ; e g u i a r r u: : ii t r i a l b e f o r e the Honorab le 
D a v i i B •)"- -f f"h' : - - t , 
s .-.JLU>—w-*.**0 a Ucxy
 f L*A*.' *• t u a y o t 
in*. . u*u_n6 ...v . n u t ,M- -J. Septemb*- - . a ..: ::i* -. ou: ' 
; h e a r d t h e *•> *• i d^n.^. ^ n M-.iofs of f e r ^ i * • arm uii " i -^n l : 
^ —itg r e s 1 1 ^ f aiiu wi,usr-
derendant having na*-^  in ov^i. * . tion for directed verdict 
r '"he C T * ' ^ 
... . „;.^  aeaiu . a- ^uiueiii.» . >. r^us-- c ; oeing now duly advised 
, v.i*ii\ :i c rc , - lerenaant Snev* . iscenser. 
'I Mar^ineau 
. *. w o o **-**£> *-*i *•V-- ^ a t l u c i 1 , w t v c * o u Hit' I * L. L» O r p O L dL L 1 .J 11 
\ be •; . L .t- :.- .- hereby granted. 
2 Tl iat ji ldgmenC 1: i= ai i. I 1:1: le same I s hereby entere :i i ii 
f a vor o f c r o s s - de f en dan t S n o w, C hr i s t en s en k I la r t in e au ai i d 
against cross-clai mants Banberry Crossing and Banberry De .' /el opment 
C- : :i : poration : i:i 1:1 :i.e i s s u e s of the cross-claim of said cross-
claimants against said cross-defendant, no cause of action. 
3. That s ad d cr oss defends ill: 1 la ve an d re co \i ei: from 
cross-claimants Banberry Crossing and Banberry Development 
Corporation its costs of court herein incurred, 
DATED thi s £ % d a) of September, ] 98 \. 
BY THE COURT 
ee, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERV ICE 
This I s to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing , Judgment was mai led, postage prepai d to the m^ 
attorneys this C$71* ^  day of September, 1 984: 
Edward M. Garrett, Esq, 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
311 South State Strei I 
Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 2 1 
Merlin L ^ . •„ . , n 
Michael R. Carls ton, Ldq 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
20 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ronai . - . :. L. &, h»*. 
PRINCE, : :i i & GELDZ;-
424 E a s t 500 Sou th , . No, JOO 
p p 1 1 - T fliro r i * T T- i ^ 3 • - ^ 
I-iaLc:*.:; A. Misuraca, Lsq. 
James L.. Beyers, Esq. 
MISURACA, BEYERS & COSTIN 
900 College Avenue 
P.O. Box 878 
Santa Rosa, C " \ 
LeRoy S. Axland, Esq. 
SUITTER, AXLAND, AEMSTROI I ,J & HANSON 
175 South West Temple 
Suite 700 
^ U T :v 1 
Jonathan A. Dibble, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake Citv, Uta,; 111 
David E, Bean, F—: 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South Fort 
Lav-c-~ \v. Ah 
Barney R. Saunders, Esq. 
268 South Main 
P.O. Box 3418 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Bruce A. Maak, Esq. 
MAAK & MAAK 
370 East South Temple, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. 
Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
139 East South Temple, Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Edward M. Garrett - #1163 
Michael A. Katz - #3817 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
Attorneys for Defendants Banberry Crossing, 
Banberry Development Corporation, Scandia 
Investment Company, Hillcrest Investment 
Company, Sidney M. Horman, Charles H. 
Horman, and M. Gordon Johnson 
311 South State Street, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-2707 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, 
N.A., and FIRST SECURITY 
FINANCIAL, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BANBERRY CROSSING, a Utah 
partnership; BANBERRY 
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation; SCANDIA 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
general partnership; 
HILLCREST INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a general partnership; 
GREGORY P. NELSON; VICTOR L. 
FOWLER; JACK J. JOHNSON; JOHN 
E. PRICE; SIDNEY M. HORMAN; 
CHARLES H. HORMAN; M. GORDON 
JOHNSON; EUGENE L. KIMBALL; 
WESTERN WOODLANDS, INC., a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
and 
KEITH GARNER and SNOW, 
CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, a 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
flfiu 
FILED 
OCT 24 1984 
Ctork of Summit Counts 
%° Daouttf Cfert 
C i v i l No. 7457 
4 O "1 1 
partnership, COMMONWEALTH 
LAND TITLE, SUMMIT COUNTY 
TITLE COMPANY and DON 
HUTCHINSON, 
Crossclaim Defendants. 
Notice is hereby given that Third Party Plaintiffs 
Banberry Crossing, Banberry Development Corporation, Scandia 
Investment Company, Hillcrest Investment Company, Sidney M. 
Horman, Charles H. Horman, lamLM-, Gordon Johnson hereby 
appeal from that • ruling—eetered by the Court on September 
J)S5, 1984, granting Third Party Defendant Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau1 s motion to direct a verdict in its favor as to 
the cause of action brought by Third Party Plaintiffs. 
DATED this Z?)~~ day of October, 1984. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
By *- ' ~~ I *^ 
Edward M.' Garrett 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /Cff"~ day of October, 
1984, true and correct copies of the foregoing Notice of 
Appeal were mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Merlin R. Lybbert, Esq. LeRoy S. Axland, Esq. 
Michael R. Carlston, Esq. SUITTER, AXLAND, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
1332 
Ronald E. Nehring, Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
424 East 500 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Malcolm A. Misuraca, Esq. 
James L. Beyers, Esq. 
MISURACA, BEYERS & COSTIN 
900 College Avenue 
Post Office Box 878 
Santa Rosa, CA 95402 
Richard D. Burbidge, Esq. 
Stephen B. Mitchell, Esq. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Elks Building 
139 East South Temple 
Suite 1 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ray R. Christensen, Esq. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jonathan A. Dibble, Esq. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
David E. Bean, Esq. 
BEAN & SMEDLEY 
190 South Fort Lane, #2 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Barney R. Saunders, Esq. 
268 South Main 
P. 0. Box 3418 
Park City, Utah 84060 
Clark Waddoups, Esq. 
ROOKER, LARSEN, KIMBALL 
& PARR 
Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Ofej^ H^V&UttA; 
